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LIBERTY BOUND: OBERGEFELL’S ECLIPSE
OF POWER TO LIMIT SEXUAL AUTONOMY
Kimberly West-Faulcon∗
“[W]hat the Court really has refused to recognize is the
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of
their intimate associations with others.”1

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its historic
opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 holding that states cannot prohibit
same-sex couples from marrying.3 The decision’s practical
significance in the lives of Americans is immense4 and it has already
been hailed as ushering in a new birth of freedom in the Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence.5 I choose to make a far less
∗ James P. Bradley Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles; B.A., Duke University; J.D., Yale Law School. I wish to thank Neil
Richmond for his excellent research assistance.
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). see also id. at 2598 (“Over time and in other contexts, the Court
has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”); id. at 2602
(“The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition . . .); see also id. (“The
right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth
Amendment is derived too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of laws.”).
3. Id. at 2607−08 (also holding that states must recognize same-sex marriages licensed and
performed in other states).
4. See, e.g., Angela K. Perone, Health Implications of the Supreme Court’s Obergefell vs.
Hodges Marriage Equality Decision, 2 LGBT Health 196 (2015), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4713052 (considering negative health effects of marriage bans and potential
health insurance and tax issues stemming from the Obergefell decision); Brittany Blackburn
Koch, The Effect of Obergefell v. Hodges for Same-Sex Couples, Nat’l L. Rev. (July 17, 2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/effect-obergefell-v-hodges-same-sex-couples (addressing
legal provisions and protections that will apply to same-sex couples after Obergefell, including
joint tax filing, intestacy laws, and estate planning benefits); Emma Green, How Will the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Same-Sex-Marriage Decision Affect Religious Liberty?, Atlantic (June 26,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/how-will-the-us-supreme-courtssame-sex-marriage-decision-affect-religious-liberty/396986 (discussing the uncertainty in “what
will happen to the many, many religious organizations that don’t support homosexuality, let alone
gay marriage.”).
5. See e.g., Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 Harv. L.
Rev. 147, 148 (2015) (describing Obergefell as “a game changer for substantive due process
jurisprudence”).
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sanguine observation. While Obergefell strongly and unequivocally
protects same-sex marriage rights, it recognizes the right to
autonomy in sexual intimacy as fundamental but without
elaboration.6 With a potential change in the ideological composition
of the Supreme Court on the horizon, it is important to be clear that
Justice Kennedy’s statement in Lawrence v. Texas7 adopting the
analysis of Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion in Bowers v.
Hardwick8 combined with Kennedy’s reference in Obergefell to
sexual intimacy as a fundamental liberty protect the fundamental
right of adult sexual autonomy from erosion.
I.
Justice Scalia’s observation that Kennedy seems to employ a
form of rational basis review in Lawrence, not strict scrutiny, to
protect the right to sexual activity has some salience.9 However,
Kennedy’s Obergefell decision refers to sexual intimacy as a
“fundamental right.”10 Close to thirty years after Bowers applied
rational basis review to Georgia’s law criminalizing anal and oral
sex11 and twelve years after Scalia contended that Lawrence’s
application of rational basis review12 left the central legal conclusion
6. 135 S. Ct. at 2606 (referencing a “intimacy” and “marriage” as “other fundamental
rights” for which it would inconsistent with the approach the Court has used to define the liberty
interest “in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices”).
7. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against him, Michael Hardwick encouraged
Americans to see the Court’s now overruled 5-4 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick Bowers as
narrowly construing the sexual autonomy rights of all persons, LGBT or not. However, the
Bowers majority opinion successfully diverted attention from how the ruling potentially
proscribed the sexual autonomy rights of heterosexuals. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2 (1986)
(accepting the district court’s determination that the heterosexual couple John and Mary Doe’s
challenge to the Georgia statute “did not have proper standing to maintain the action” and
observing “[w]e express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statue as applied to
other acts of sodomy”). The Court’s myopic description of the issue in Bowers as the
constitutionality of a Georgia anti-sodomy statute only “as applied to consensual homosexual
sodomy” ignored the law’s explicit restriction on both heterosexual and homosexual anal and oral
sex. Id.
9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586, (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Lawrence majority
opinion as failing to apply strict scrutiny by stating “nor does it subject the Texas law to the
standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a
‘fundamental right’”).
10. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (explicitly employing the term “fundamental
right” in the phrase “it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other
fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy”).
11. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (finding Georgia anti-sodomy statute satisfied the rational
basis standard of review).
12. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Donald H.J. Hermann,
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of Bowers “strangely untouched,”13 this should relegate to a debate
of only academic consequence the argument that Lawrence v. Texas
fails to protect sexual autonomy as a fundamental right.14
While Obergefell facilitates revisiting the issue of what standard
of review applies to laws infringing on the fundamental right to
sexual autonomy, the doctrinal clarity the case provides with respect
to laws prohibiting same-sex marriage potentially introduces a
doctrinal paradox: that laws that infringe the fundamental right of
same-sex couples to marry would trigger strict scrutiny analysis but
laws that infringe on the fundamental right of consenting adults to
make decisions with regards to sexual intimacy might not warrant
that same high level of judicial scrutiny. Does infringement of the
fundamental right to sexual autonomy merely trigger Justice
Kennedy’s idiosyncratic “animus test”15 or are laws criminalizing
adult consensual sexual decisions subject to the more robust and
more predictably rights-protective strict scrutiny standard?
II.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared strict scrutiny to
be the proper standard for protecting the freedom to sexual autonomy
infringed by the Georgia law under review in Bowers,16 doing so
long before Justice Kennedy’s first explicit reference to sexual
Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right of Privacy: Sex and the Constitution, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 909,
941 (2005) (“Thus, the majority found no need to determine whether sexual intimacy, including
sexual activity between unmarried persons or persons of the same sex, involved a fundamental
right since the statute did not survive rational basis review, obviating the need to apply a strict
scrutiny analysis.”).
13. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court majority in Lawrence as “not
hav[ing] the boldness to reverse” “Bowers’ conclusion that homosexual sodomy is not a
‘fundamental right’” and noting that Kennedy only used the terms “fundamental propositions”
and “fundamental decisions,” not the term fundamental right).
15. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 151, 169−70
(describing Justice Kennedy’s use of rational basis to strike down laws in Romer v. Evans and
Lawrence v. Texas as applying an “animus test”).
16. The Eleventh Circuit used the following language:
The Georgia sodomy statue implicates a fundamental right of Michael Hardwick. The
activity he hopes to engage in is quintessentially private and lies at the heart of an
intimate association beyond the proper reach of state regulation. . . . We therefore
remand this case for trial, at which time the State must prove in order to prevail that it
has a compelling interest in regulating this behavior and that this statute is the most
narrowly drawn means of safeguarding that interest.
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212−13 (1985) (emphasis added).
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autonomy as a fundamental right. Now that Kennedy has definitively
recognized the fundamental nature of sexual autonomy in Obergefell,
Scalia’s view that Kennedy’s Lawrence analysis sets rational basis as
the standard for reviewing laws that criminalize adult sexual
intimacies is untenable.
In his 2003 Lawrence opinion, Kennedy is definitive in his
rejection of the Bowers holding and reasoning when he declares
Bowers incorrect in framing the legal question as whether the
constitution “confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy.”17 However, instead of making it clear that a law
banning anal and oral sex is subject to strict scrutiny analysis
because it infringes on a fundamental right, Kennedy’s ultimate
analysis uses the terminology long-associated with the rational basis
standard of review—whether the law serves a “legitimate”
government purpose.18 Because of this—Justice Kennedy seemingly
using rational basis instead of strict scrutiny as the standard the
Texas law had to meet, Justice Scalia characterized Lawrence as
aligned with Bowers in deeming rational basis to be the proper test
for justifying a state law infringing sexual autonomy.19
While rhetorically clever, there are two reasons—one that
predates Obergefell and another made possible by it—that undermine
the validity of future invocations of Scalia’s reasoning to argue
government efforts to regulate sexual intimacy among consenting
adults need only satisfy rational basis review. First, in language
Justice Scalia’s dissent ignores, Lawrence explicitly incorporates,
albeit without quotation, the analysis in Justice Stevens’ Bowers
dissent as controlling and integral to the Lawrence holding. Second,
now that Obergefell has clearly embraced sexual autonomy as a
fundamental right on par with marriage autonomy, Scalia’s argument
that Kennedy’s use of the term “legitimate” instead of the word
17. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563, 566–67 (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (West
2003)). Justice Kennedy also engaged in a detailed historical analysis of anti-sodomy laws that
led his to the conclusion that the question of whether there is a history and tradition of prohibiting
private homosexual sex between consenting adults was “more complex than the majority opinion
and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate[d].” Id. at 571.
18. Id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”) (emphasis added).
19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586, (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the “actual holding” in
Lawrence is that the Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy “furthers no legitimate state
interest” and thereby only applies “an unheard-of form of rational-basis review” not a heightened
judicial scrutiny).
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“compelling”—the standard applicable under strict scrutiny—has
even less persuasive value than it may have had prior to Obergefell.
Lawrence explicitly incorporates Justice Stevens’ definitive
treatment of sexual autonomy as a fundamental right. While Justice
Scalia is correct that the text of Lawrence does not use the term
“fundamental right” nor the term “fundamental liberty interest,”20 the
dissent by Justice Stevens in Bowers that Kennedy declares to be part
and parcel of his Lawrence opinion does assert clearly that the Due
Process Clause protects “the right to engage in nonreproductive
sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral.”21
Even if it were plausible pre-Obergefell, the Lawrence majority
opinion’s inclusion of Justice Stevens’s Bowers dissent means
Lawrence can no longer be fairly read as condoning judicial
treatment of the right to sexual autonomy as a second-class liberty.
When Lawrence and Obergefell are read together, there is no
plausible interpretation other than that the right to engage in
nonreproductive sexual conduct that others may find offensive (how
Stevens described the right he clearly deemed constitutionally
protected) is enjoyed by all persons, irrespective of sexual
orientation.
CONCLUSION
Three decades after Bowers v. Hardwick, the landmark
Obergefell v. Hodges decision protecting same-sex marriage rights
lifts the cloud on whether the Court’s protection of sexual autonomy
rights as fundamental requires the application of strict scrutiny. Even
after Obergefell’s textual reference to sexual intimacy as a
fundamental right, I expect that some jurists will seek to argue state
regulation of sexual behavior between consenting adults in private is
only subject to, at most, the toughened version of rational basis
review applied in Lawrence. However, as much as Obergefell’s
vigorous protection of the right to marry for same-sex couples is
20. Id. 593 (“Not once does it describe homosexual sodomy as a ‘fundamental right’ or a
“fundamental liberty interest,’ nor does it subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny.”).
21. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In all events, it is perfectly clear that
the State of Georgia may not totally prohibit the conduct proscribed by § 16-6-2 of the Georgia
Criminal Code.”). Cf. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(stating in characterizing the majority opinion that “what the Court really has refused to recognize
is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate
associations with others”).
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front and center in the opinion, the case also makes it more difficult
to contend adult sexual intimacy rights fail to warrant the heightened
standard of strict scrutiny as protection. Obergefell’s role in
providing greater clarity as to the limits on the government’s power
to regulate sexual intimacy behind closed bedroom doors means the
decision is of broader personal significance to Americans of all
sexual orientations than many would realize22—a point Michael
Hardwick would likely have sought to emphasize.23

Kindly be informed that this is the last page of the Forward. The next
Article begins on page 375.

22. Research shows fewer and fewer persons of any sexual orientation are financial able or
are opting to marry. Cf. Melissa Murray, Recovering the Right to Not Marry, Calif. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652478; Douglas
NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its
Relationship to Marriage, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 87 (2014) (noting that fewer Americans have the
inclination and financial resources to enter into marriage).
23. Cf. In criticizing the Court’s decision in Bowers, Hardwick called for the “gay
community to pull together, and also for the heterosexual community to pull together, against
something that’s affecting both of us.” PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS:
SIXTEEN AMERICANS WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 403 (1988).

